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1. Introduction 
Export subsidy reductions is one of the three pillars of commitments made in the 
Agreement on Agriculture (hereafter “the Agreement”) in the World Trade Organization (WTO).   
However, very little research has been undertaken.  Discipline on export competition measures is 
deemed to be an important accomplishment, because it has been included in agriculture for the 
first time.  The purpose of this research is to assess the extent to which export subsidy 
commitments have been effective, and what modifications are needed to improve their 
performance.  To do so, an overview of policy developments is undertaken, with a focus on the 
economics of the bindings imposed on export subsidies. 
Several commentators argue that export subsidies are the most distorting of agricultural 
policy interventions, and so should be outlawed (e.g. Josling; McCalla).  However, an export 
subsidy has the same trade distorting effects as an import barrier for the same market 
supply/demand conditions.  The source of this confusion may be that competing export subsidy 
programs by two or more countries is self-defeating.  However, this is true for import restrictions 
as well, which lower world prices and require other countries to increase tariffs to maintain the 
same level of producer support.  Indeed, import barriers by some countries increase the need for 
export subsidies by others and vice versa.  Hence, disciplines on export subsidies should receive 
the same urgency as that on market access
1. 
Trade liberalization under export subsidy reduction schedules includes limits on both 
expenditures and physical quantities.  The effects of those limits vary under different scenarios.  
We isolate the factors affecting export subsidy expenditures in the intervening years, in order to 
measure the binding effect of limits on volume versus value limits on export subsidies.  Several 
                                                 
1 Export Subsidies are illegal in the GATT, which is an indication of this political bias.  
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other issues regarding export subsidy policy commitments are identified.  We analyze the 
relative effectiveness of volume versus value constraints under changing market conditions. For 
example, for the scheduled reductions the volume limit is always binding for a given static 
scenario, but value can become binding if the ratio of the reductions follows certain proportions, 
or if changes in baseline conditions occur.  The choice of base period and world market 
developments may be contributing to subsidy reductions rather than genuine efforts by 
governments to reduce price supports that determine subsidy levels.  Export subsidy limits on 
both expenditures and physical quantities are also negated somewhat by aggregation across 
products and over time. 
The traditional approach to measuring the liberalizing effects of protection bindings has 
treated protection (tariffs and subsidies) as deterministic.  The liberalizing effects of the 
introduction of a new binding or a reduction in an existing binding on export subsidies is 
traditionally defined as zero if the binding is above the applied rate, and one otherwise.  This 
approach ignores the impact of bindings above the mean and moreover, it overstates the marginal 
impact of reductions in bindings below the applied rate.   
For the specific case of bindings and rules as trade liberalization, we apply the 
methodology developed by Martin and Francois (1997) as a “general approach …allowing the 
benefits of new bindings, reductions in existing bindings and improvements in the rules of the 
trading system to be evaluated”.  This method treats protection as a random variable by 
considering the effects of a binding on the mean and variance of protection, as opposed to the 
traditional approach where protection is treated as deterministic.  The value of export subsidies 
will be analyzed using this methodology in order to quantify the trade liberalization effects of the 
rules and changes in the rules under the Uruguay round reduction commitments and beyond.  
  3 
 
2.  An Overview of Export Subsidy Commitments in the Agreement 
Limits on and reductions in the volume and value of export subsidies for 25 countries 
(and the prohibition of new subsidies) was the cornerstone of export subsidy commitments in the 
Agreement.  Additional countries have recently joined the reduction commitments.  Each country 
agreed to reducing the volume of subsidized exports by 21 percent over 6 years from a 1986-90 
average base period level (14 percent over a 10-year period for developing countries), and reduce 
the value of export subsidies by 36 percent (24 percent over 10 years for developing countries).  
The Agreement provides flexibility by allowing countries to redistribute the value of subsidies or 
the volume of subsidized exports between years but the cumulative totals through the year 
2000/01 are not to exceed those that would have resulted from full compliance.  Countries were 
also permitted to aggregate products within a commodity group in their commitments. 
WTO notifications have the European Union spending the lion’s share (over 80 percent) 
of total world export subsidies (Table 1). 
Table 1: Total Export Subsidy Commitments  
  Base  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  2000 bound 
European Union (million 
ECU) 
11,700 4,800  5,500 4,400  7,400 
United States (million US$)  930 26  122  113  590 
World total (million US$)  21,000 6,900  7,000  5,500  13,400 
The United States export subsidy expenditures were less than several countries including South 
Africa (which eliminated export subsidies in 1997) and Switzerland.  Canada eliminated 
transportation subsidies for exports and so reduced their support in this category dramatically 
(See Chart 1 for Baseline and Chart 2 for 1995/96 levels in the Appendix).  Several countries and 
commodity sectors have exceeded their commitments (see Table 2; de Gorter; Ruiz).  
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3.   The Economics of Volume versus Value Commitments on Export Subsidies 
A key policy issue is whether the formula for further cuts in export subsidies should 
focus on volumes or expenditures.  Indeed the volume exported is part of the value of export 
subsidies.  Assuming both restrictions in volume and value are binding in the baseline, with no 
change in economic conditions (excess supply and demand curves do not shift), the effects of 
both types of bindings are not obvious.  
Assume for example, that in the baseline, both the volume of subsidized exports and the 
value of export subsidy expenditures are limiting.  Let us first consider the case when the excess 
supply and demand curves do not shift over time.  A 21 percent reduction in the volume of 
exports with an export subsidy may result in exports being equal to or less than the free trade 
level Q* (where the per unit export subsidy will fall to zero).  In this case, the volume constraint 
will be more liberalizing and any reduction beyond Q* would not be necessary.  Reducing the 
volume of exports receiving a subsidy results in a lower price gap, which becomes zero at Q*.  
One needs a less than 100 percent reduction in the volume of subsidized exports to reach free 
trade, unlike the case for reductions in export expenditures.   
Per-unit subsidy and volume exported are limited by the shape and position of excess 
supply and excess demand curves.  If the volume commitment is binding, it is not possible to 
apply a larger per-unit subsidy.  Therefore, in a static analysis, value bindings would not be 
necessary if there is a volume constraint.  
For the case where only value is constrained, it is not possible to subsidize more exports 
with a decreasing per-unit subsidy, because the per-unit subsidy increases with exports.  
Therefore, if value commitment is binding, there is no need for a volume binding in a static 
analysis.  Hence, we need to analyze the relative effectiveness of each type of binding.   
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We develop an analytical framework that allows us to analyze the economics of volume 
versus value as a static framework, and under different supply and demand conditions.  In the 
static analysis, we analyze the case where there is no change in baseline market conditions before 
reductions take place. Export subsidy reductions are applied only once.  The dynamic analysis 
will consider the scenarios in which changes occur in the baseline scenario in the meantime.  In 
other words, changes in excess supply and excess demand curves occur before the reductions are 
realized.  Also, changes that occur after the reduction commitments are met are analyzed. 
Static Analysis 
 
Assume in the baseline scenario that a given country applies a per-unit subsidy s0 to a 
given commodity, resulting in exports Q0.  Assume that s0 and Q0 determine the initial value and 
volume that will be reduced as specified in the commitments.  
Consider an inverse excess supply curve 
(1) bQ a Pd + =  
where Pd is the domestic price, and an inverse excess demand curve  
(2) dQ c Pw + =  
where Pw is the world price and Q is imports (imports = exports).  The per-unit export subsidy in 
the base time t = 0 is: 
(3)  0 w d 0 d)Q (b c) (a P P s − + − = = −  
The value of the export subsidy in the baseline is given by 
(4)  [] 0 0 0 Q d)Q (b c) (a V − + − =   
Define β  as the proportion of baseline values of export subsidies that is allowed.  This is 
the value of export subsidies remaining after the reductions are accomplished.  Hence, β  = 1- 
Vred, where Vred is the required percentage reduction in the value of export subsidies. Define α  as  
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the proportion of baseline volume of subsidized exports that is allowed (after reductions).   
Hence, α  = 1 - Qred, where Qred is the percentage reduction in the volume of subsidized exports.  
To compare the effect of a reduction in volume versus value, define 
(4a)  [] 0 0 ￿ Q ￿ d)Q (b c) (a V − + − =  
where Vβ   is the value in dollars of export subsidies remaining, after the value reduction 
commitment is met, and 
(4b)  0 0 . Q ]. Q . d) (b c) [(a V − + − =  
where Vα  is the value in dollars of export subsidy remaining, after volume reduction 
commitment is met.  Equating equations (4a) and (4b), we can determine the conditions under 
which α  and β  generate volume exported and value of export subsidies that are equally binding, 
that is when Vβ    =  Vα : 
(5)   [] . 0 0 0 0 ￿ V Q ]. Q . d) (b c) [(a Q ￿ d)Q (b c) (a V = − + − = − + − =  
Solving equation (5) for Q0 gives: 
(6) 







=  where 0 < α  < 1, 0 < β  < 1 
Solving equation (3) for Q0, substituting in equation (5) and solving for β  gives: 
(7)  .￿. a)(1 (c s . ￿ 0
2 − − − =  
Proposition 1: For identical reductions in volume and value (α = β  < 1), the volume reduction is 
always binding.  This result is independent of the elasticities of excess supply and excess 
demand. 
Proof: By definition, baseline value and volume are equally binding, and α = β  = 1 when no 
reductions were imposed.  By imposing the restriction α = β  < 1 in equation (5), we can show 
that the volume reduction becomes binding, because the left-hand side of equation (5) becomes  
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larger (note that α
2 < α  because 0 < α  < 1).  Vα  is the value of export subsidy after the volume 
reduction commitment is met, and if it is smaller than Vβ ,  the volume reductions are more 
binding for any α = β  < 1.   
However, we cannot infer from proposition 1 that reductions in value have to be larger 
than reductions in volume in order to be binding at the same Q0.  To determine the values of α  
and β  where reductions are equally binding, we impose the following restrictions on equation 
(6): Q0 > 0, c > a (excess supply intercept is smaller than excess demand intercept) and d < 0 
(slope of the excess demand curve is negative). Therefore, (a-c) < 0, and (b-d) > 0. The 
conditions that satisfy Q > 0 on (6) are:  β  > α  or β  < α
2.  These are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for volume and value reductions to be equally binding at positive quantities traded. 
Note that these conditions do not determine the exact relationship between α  and β , but they do 
rule out some combinations of α  and β  that are not equally binding. 
Corollary:  For the current reduction commitments (21% in volume and 36% in value
2), the 
value reduction will never be binding because: 
β  = 0.64 or 0.76 (1- Vred for developed and developing countries, respectively)  
α  = 0.79 or 0.86 (1- Qred for developed and developing countries, respectively)  
α
2 = 0.62 or 0.74 
These values of α  and β  do not satisfy β  > α  or β  < α
2, and therefore cannot be equally 
binding.  If we substitute these values of α  and β  in equation (5), Vβ  becomes larger than Vα ,  
showing that Vα  is binding.  Therefore, the value of export subsidies after the 21% or 14% 
volume reduction is smaller than the volume left from a 36% or 24% value reduction, and hence 
the volume limit is binding.  
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Proposition 2: For a reduction in value to be binding, the ratio of the reduction commitments in 
value and volume has to be smaller than the ratio of the initial and reduced per unit export 
subsidy. 
Proof: We rewrite equation (5) in general form, where ES(.) is the excess supply curve, and ES 
= Pd = a + bQ; ED(.) is the excess demand curve, and ED = Pw = c + dQ: 
(8)  [] [ ] V. Q . ) Q ED( ) Q ES( Q ￿ ) Q ED( ) Q ES( V 0 0 0 0 0 0 ￿ = α − α < − =  
where Vβ   < Vα  determines that the final value of the subsidy after an 1 - β  reduction in value will 
be smaller (and therefore binding) than the final value of the subsidy after a 1 - α  reduction in 
volume.  Solving equation (8) for β /α  gives:  
(9)  []






) ED(Q ) ES(Q







 When  β/α  < s/s0, value can be binding; when β/α  > s/s0 volume can be binding (but still 
the relative values of α  and β  have to satisfy β  > α  or β  < α
2 for value to be possibly binding).  
Therefore, at baseline, α = β =1  and s = s0 (no reductions, both volume and value are binding).  
In order to get s < s0 (reduction in per-unit subsidy), α  has to be either larger than β , which 
contradicts Proposition 1, or β  has to be smaller than α
2 , which seems more logical. This 
confirms that reductions in value (1 - β)  have to be significantly larger than reductions in volume 
(1 − α)  in order for value commitments to be binding. 
This relationship allows us to forecast of the effects of bindings on the reduction of per-
unit subsidies for a given set of parameters.  Therefore, when reductions are negotiated, a 
country can analyze the final per-unit export subsidy resulting from the proposed α  and β  
reductions for each commodity sector, and determine the reduction in exports for given supply 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 For developing countries, the reductions are 14% in volume and 24% in value.  
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and demand conditions.  
Proposition 3: For a larger initial per-unit export subsidy, ceteris paribus, volume reduction 
commitments are relatively more effective. 
Proof:  In the baseline, assume that both value and volume are binding, no reductions were 
applied, and α = β = 1 .  Then, reductions are applied to value and volume.  From equation (7), 
we can show that the larger the initial subsidy s0, the larger the reductions in value have to be for 
each (1 - α)  reduction in volume: 
(7)  .￿. a)(1 (c s . ￿ 0
2 − − − ≤  
For expenditure reductions to be binding, β  has to be sufficiently small, and therefore 
reduction in expenditures has to be sufficiently large (because β  = 1- Vred or the proportion of the 
value of export subsidies allowed by the reduction in value).  We can conclude that the higher 
the initial subsidy, ceteris paribus, the more likely that volume reductions will be binding, 
because β  is decreasing in s0.  Intuitively, we can understand that volume reductions happen in 
one dimension, while value reductions involve reduction of an area (exports multiplied by the 
per-unit export subsidy).  Therefore, for a larger area (which implies a larger per-unit export 
subsidy, ceteris paribus) the value reductions would affect volume of exports less dramatically 
than a reduction in volume itself.  
Proposition 4: For larger initial quantities exported (ceteris paribus), value reductions are 
relatively more likely to bind.  







=   
Solving equation (3) for Q0 gives:  











which shows that Q0  > Q*.  There is a maximum reduction in volume that will make Q0 = Q*, 
which is the free trade equilibrium and s  = 0.  Let us define α ˆ  as the minimum α  (or the 






. ˆ * Q Q . ˆ = ⇒ =  
The range of volume reductions (α ) is then [ α ˆ , 1]  and the range of value reductions (β ) 






This diagram shows that the same β  is equally binding at increasing reductions in volume 
(decreasing α ˆ ), when Q0 increases. 
  From (12), we differentiate α  with respect to Q0, which gives: 











   Therefore, for larger initial quantities Q0, ceteris paribus, the reductions in volume to 
achieve free trade have to be larger (for the same per-unit export subsidy).  Also, α ˆ  has to be 
smaller for the same reduction in expenditures β .  Therefore, a reduction in volume has to be 












  11 
 
are relatively more likely to be binding for larger volumes exported, ceteris paribus. 
Note from (13) that α  is not linear in volume. For larger volumes we need increasing 
reductions in α  to achieve free trade.  Also, the area to the right of the solid lines on the diagram 
is the area of volume binding.   Recalling that α  = 1- Qred, and Qred is the percentage reduction in 
volume of subsidized exports, the smaller the area, the more volume reductions are binding, and 
that occurs with smaller Q0, for which the range of reductions for volume to achieve free trade is 
relatively smaller.  
Proposition 5: For more elastic curves, ceteris paribus, value reduction commitments become 
relatively more effective. 
Proof: Note that on equation (7), β  is a function of volume restrictions α , initial per-unit 
subsidies s0 and intercepts a and c.  The value reduction 1 - β  is not a function of elasticities.    
However, we can use the findings in propositions 3 and 4 to set the framework for 
analyzing how bindings are affected by the value of trade elasticities.  Proposition 3 shows that a 
value reduction is more effective for smaller per-unit subsidies: we then keep a, c and 
(implicitly) Q0  constant in (7) and decrease s0.  This is only achieved by making the excess 
demand and supply curves more elastic. In Figure 1a below, this corresponds to decreasing the 
per-unit subsidy from distance gh = s0 to the bold segment s’ at Q0.  This proves that more elastic 
curves (smaller per-unit export subsidies, ceteris paribus) make the value reduction more 
effective.  
Proposition 4 states that for larger initial quantities exported (ceteris paribus), value 
reductions are more likely to bind.  So we keep c, a and s0 constant, and increase Q0.  Again, this 
is only achieved by making the excess demand and supply curves more elastic.  For increasing 
Q0, ceteris paribus, the curves become more elastic.  Therefore, for more elastic curves value 
reductions are more likely binding, given that in Proposition 4 we proved that for increasing Q0  
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expenditure reductions are more likely to bind.  In Figure 1b below, this corresponds to 
increasing initial volume from Q0
1 to Q0
2.  This proves that more elastic curves (larger initial 
volume, ceteris paribus) make the value reduction more effective.  







The analysis in propositions 1 to 5 is in static framework.  But conditions of trade may 
change, and therefore the analysis needs to be augmented to include a dynamic analysis where 
the free trade equilibrium shifts during the export subsidy reduction implementation period, or 
after the reductions have been accomplished. 
Dynamic Analysis: Shifts in the Free Trade Equilibrium 
The second part of our analysis considers shifts in the excess supply and demand curves 
that occurred during the implementation time period, before or after reduction commitments are 
met.   Figure 2 depicts two cases: the free trade equilibrium point shifted to the left in panel (A) 
with negative (or inward) shifts in excess supply and/or excess demand; or the reverse in panel 
(B) where the free trade equilibrium shifted to the right due to positive (outward) shifts in excess 
supply and/or excess demand.  The effectiveness of a volume versus an expenditure constraint 
depends on the goal of the government.  Politicians have the option to maximize any one of at 
least four potential policy targets to fulfill political demands as best as possible under changing 
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market conditions and WTO export subsidy commitments: the per unit export subsidy, total 
export subsidy expenditures, the volume of exports subsidized, or domestic price levels.  
If the free trade equilibrium shifts to the left, volume limits become less binding.  We can 
have “water” in the volume limit, if value commitments bind at a lower Q.  It is more likely that 
countries that reduced their schedule of exports over the implementation period will have to 
increase per-unit subsidy on a smaller volume of exports.  It is possible, though, that countries 
will not be able to spend all their value allowances, if it means exports above the volume limit.  
It would be possible to keep the level of domestic prices if the shift is in excess supply. 
If the trade equilibrium shifted to the right, value limits became less binding, so we can 
have “water” in the value limit.  It is more likely that countries will have to reduce the per-unit 
subsidy, and that the domestic price will have to fall due to the volume binding.  The volume of 





























Figure 2: Shifts in the Free Trade Equilibrium with Export Volume/Value Limits  
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Proposition 6: Assume that both volume and value reductions are equally binding at Q0 after the 
reductions have occurred.  When exogenous shifts in ES and ED occur, volume constraints are 
always binding in the case of a positive shift, and expenditure constraints are always binding in 
the case of a negative shift. 
Proof: Suppose that reductions in value and volume are equally binding at α Q0, such that Vβ   =  
Vα  and s0 (α ) = s0 (β) .  
Outward (Positive) Shift: 
For volume restriction α , the reduced per-unit export subsidy equals: 
(14)   0 Q d). (b c) (a s − + − = α  
If a positive shift in excess demand occurs, the reduced per-unit subsidy becomes 
(15)   0 k , Q . d) (b kc) (a s − + − = α  
where k > 1 is an intercept shifter. Clearly sα ,k < sα   , and because volume is limited by α Q0, the 
subsidy value is unambiguously reduced after the shift.  
For value binding β , the reduced export subsidy expenditure equals 
(4a)   [] 0 0 ￿ Q ￿ d)Q (b c) (a V − + − =  
If a positive shift in excess demand occurs, volume is not limited by α Q0, so the new 
subsidy value becomes 
(16)   [] k k k ￿￿ Q ￿ d)Q (b kc) (a V − + − =  
We can have the same value of export subsidy (Vβ   =  Vβ, k ) with a smaller per-unit export 
subsidy and a larger quantity.  Value of export subsidy does not change for value binding β  after 
the shift. 
Therefore, for an outward shift in excess demand, expenditures have to be reduced due to 
a volume binding, but do not need to change due to the value binding: that means that a volume  
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binding will be more trade liberalizing.  The same reasoning is valid for a positive shift in excess 
supply, where the new supply intercept is ka , and 0 < k < 1. 
Inward (Negative) Shift:  
If a negative shift in excess demand occurs, the same reasoning is valid for volume and 
expenditure reductions.   In the case of a volume binding, Q0 doesn’t change in equation (15), so 
the per-unit subsidy sα ,k will increase, increasing the value of the subsidy. In this case, 0 < k < 1. 
 In the case of a value binding, in order to make Vβ   =  Vβ, k    (equations (4a) and (16), Q0 
has to be reduced, and the expenditures are reduced with respect with the initial Q0.  
Therefore, in the case of a negative shift in excess demand, expenditures become binding 
and are more trade liberalizing.  The same reasoning is valid for a negative shift in excess 
supply, where the new supply intercept is ka , and k > 1. 
Proposition 6 is only true if volume and expenditures are equally binding in baseline. 
If value reduction commitments are binding after the reductions, however, a positive shift 
on excess demand or excess supply can result in either volume or value commitments that are 
binding, depending on the magnitude of the shift and on Vβ  and Vα . For a negative shift, value 
continues to bind. 
If volume reduction commitments are binding after the reductions, a negative shift on 
excess demand or excess supply can result in either volume or value commitments that are 
binding, depending on the magnitude of the shift and on Vβ  and Vα . For a positive shift, volume 
continues to bind.  
Propositions 1 to 6 will be used to discuss bindings under the following scenarios. 
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Level of Agricultural Prices  
  Given variations in world prices with shifts on the excess demand and supply curves, a 
binding on volumes exported will become limiting with any changes in domestic or world prices 
that reduce the per-unit subsidy (an outward shift in excess demand and/or in excess supply).  
Therefore, in periods of expansion of agricultural production and consumption, volume bindings 
are essential for keeping export subsidy values from escalating.  This reasoning may seem 
counterintuitive, because for higher levels of world prices, the need for subsidies is reduced.   
However, this is true only with respect to the per-unit export subsidy, with no regards to what 
happens to total expenditures and volume of subsidized exports.  The volume binding is more 
effective than the value binding with outward shifts in excess supply or excess demand curves. 
A binding on the value of subsidy will become limiting with any changes in domestic or 
world prices that increases the per-unit subsidy (an inward shift in excess demand and/or in 
excess supply).  In those periods of contraction of agricultural production and consumption, a 
limit on expenditures (value) on export subsidies will help to force consumers and producers to 
respond to real market conditions instead of consume and produce at levels that are artificially 
maintained by an increase in subsidies. 
Elasticity of excess supply and demand   
Effectiveness of a volume versus a value constraint may vary under different elasticities.  
As showed in Proposition 5, more inelastic excess supply and demand curves will have the 
volume limit be relatively more effective.  The opposite is true for more elastic curves.  For a 
given percentage reduction in the baseline export subsidy expenditures, a larger volume can be 
subsidized when the curves are elastic.  As agricultural supply and demand are generally 
characterized as inelastic, it suggests that volume bindings are generally more effective.  
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Fixed Internal Price Supports 
In a scenario where domestic price is fixed (guaranteed), the per-unit export subsidy must 
fluctuate to accommodate the difference between domestic and world prices (an open-ended 
export subsidy).  However, the value and volume reduction commitments will limit the 
possibility of using of this type of instrument. 
If the value commitment is binding, and therefore the total value of subsidies cannot be 
increased, domestic price will have to fall if the gap between world and domestic price becomes 
wider (an inward shift in world demand).   But countries can use another type of mechanism. 
Countries can subsidize only part of the exports by the total amount of the gap and spend all the 
value allowed, and the rest will be traded at lower world prices.  This represents “seasonal” 
subsidies, where exports receive subsidies during alternative sub-periods, such that the total of 
the period would not exceed the constraint, but individual sub-periods would.  The mechanism 
allows countries to circumvent volume bindings.  In contrast, for the case of an increase in world 
demand, the same binding volume can be subsidized by a smaller per-unit export subsidy, and 
therefore fixed domestic prices will not change. 
Effects on Farmers’ Revenues Stability 
The bindings affect the way governments and producers can deal with instability in 
revenues and government expenditures.  Note that the volume limit alone would reduce the 
instability on producer’s revenues, because the government would be able cover the difference 
Pd-Pw for any shifts in excess supply and excess demand (an open-ended export subsidy).  The 
value limits, however, increase the instability of producer’s revenues because the government 
can only subsidize the gap Pd-Pw up to the value limit, but government expenditures are kept 
constant.  This scenario can be compared with the “tariff versus quota effects” Nancy.   
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We analyzed the affects of positive and negative shifts in excess demand and excess 
supply on producers’ revenues and government expenditures, given three baseline scenarios: 
when both volume and value were binding in baseline, when only volume was binding, and 
when only value was binding.  
In the case of shifts in world demand, there is only one possible outcome in which 
producers can increase their revenues, and that is when only value is binding in the baseline and 
a positive shift in excess demand occurs.  On the other hand, government expenditures do not 
change in almost all scenarios, and expenditures only increase in one scenario, that is when only 
volume is binding in the baseline, and a negative shift in excess demand occurs. The value limit 
is the cause for revenue instability (negative outcomes), and volume limit is the cause for non-
materialized gains in the case of an expansion in excess demand. So when there is instability in 
revenues, it always occurs with lower revenues. 
In the case of shifts in excess supply, most of the outcomes are ambiguous with respect to 
revenues, which is by itself a sign of instability. They depend on elasticities and on the 
relationship between α  and β .  When the outcome is unambiguous, it is negative (revenues 
decrease) as in the case of a positive shift in excess supply with both volume and value binding, 
and with volume only binding in baseline.  The volume limit is the cause for decreases in 
revenues.  Government expenditures are very stable, and only increase in one outcome, and this 
is when volume is binding in the baseline and there is a negative shift in excess supply. 
4.  Bindings and Trade Liberalization 
 
Export subsidies will change in response to a change in the underlying determinants of 
protection, namely prices and volume of trade, exchange rates, and other macroeconomic  
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conditions which are all stochastic.  Therefore, we can treat export subsidies as a random 
variable with a probability distribution. 
In using the value of exports as a variable, it is possible to evaluate the effects of the 
schedule of reductions in export subsidies.  This is done by comparing the mean and variance of 
the underlying distribution of the value exported in the presence of a binding with those in the 
absence of a binding.  The same approach can use volume, per-unit subsidy or other variables.  
The conventional approach (Tangermann 1997, Leetmaa 1997-1998, and de Gorter 1999) has a 
binding above the actual level of protection to have no effect, and implies that if the export 
subsidy bindings in the current commitments are above the levels exercised by countries, the 
commitments are not trade liberalizing.  With this new approach, it is possible to measure the 
trade liberalizing effect of such bindings, considering that above-the-mean bindings do have an 
effect and that below-the-mean bindings are overestimated by the traditional approach.  
If we assume protection is a random variable with a normal distribution, the expected 
level of subsidy is the mean of the distribution.  If a binding is introduced, it rules out any 
possibility of protection above the binding level, and therefore the expected mean of the subsidy 
and the variability will decrease. 
Data on value of export subsidies for the European Union for various commodity groups 
was collected for the years 1972-1999.  Applying the methodology developed by Martin and 
Francois, the new mean of the distribution µ 1 is: 
(17)  F(Z*)) (1 ) ￿ (B
2 Z*) 1/2( e
2￿
1
1 ￿ ￿ 0 0 0 1 − − + − − =   
  20 
 
where µ 0 is the mean of the distribution of the variable from 1972-90
3, Z = (V0-µ 0)/σ 0 is the 
normalized variable, V0 is the variable of value of export subsidies, and Z* = (B-µ 0)/σ 0 is the 
value of the normalized variable at the bound rate. Β  is the value binding and F is the cumulative 
density function of the variable.  The binding value B is calculated as required in the Agreement, 
with a 36% reduction in the average value of subsidies from 1986-90. 
Expression (17) was used to find the long run mean of value of subsidy following the 
introduction of a binding, and to compare it with the original mean.  
The results for selected commodity groups are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Summary Statistics for Export Subsidies- European Union (million ECUs) 





1. Average  Value 
             1972-90:  (µ 0)  8,163.38 2,135.46 67.93  30.27  1,128.36  1,001.66  136.93  26.71 
2.  Bound value: (B)  7,616.87 2,304.79 64.77  59.16  1,175.02  927.57  148.64  30.07 
3. B  - µ 0: (2-3)  (546.51) 169.33 (3.15)  28.89  46.66  (74.10)  11.71  3.37 
4.  Bound Mean (µ 1)  7,014.72 1,608.84 52.52  6.40  805.94  759.41  98.21  15.47 
5.  µ 1-µ 0: (4 -1)  (1,148.66) (526.62) (15.41)  (23.88)  (322.42)  (242.25)  (38.72)  (11.24) 
6.  36% off original mean 
(µ 0*0.64)  5,224.56 1,366.69 43.47  19.37  722.15  641.06  87.63  17.09 
7. B  –(µ 0*0.64):  (2 –6)  2,392.30 938.09 21.30  39.79  452.87  286.50  61.01  12.98 
8.  ϑ  (µ 1 )/ϑ B  0.56 0.44 0.53  0.27  0.48  0.54  0.45  0.45 
 
The results in row 5 of Table 3 show that the average value of export subsidies after the 
imposition of a binding (µ 1) is lower than the original average (µ  0 ). This means that even if the 
binding is above the actual values applied, it has an effect of decreasing the average value of 
export subsidies.  When a binding is imposed above the actual levels of protection, it may seem 
that no liberalization in trade has occurred, or even that the levels of protection have increased. 
                                                 
3 We limited the period to 1972-1990 because after 1991, it became very clear that reductions on export subsidies 
would be required by the Agreement, and countries could react by increasing export subsidies while they could do 
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However, when looking at the levels over time, the liberalizing effect of imposing a binding 
becomes clear through the lower average of protection applied.  This type of analysis is 
particularly applicable for export subsidies, because open-ended export subsidies in the EU 
generate an increase in instability of the value of export subsidies applied.   
The value binding applied to export subsidies is already lower than the average value 
from 1972-90 for rice, beef/veal, and in aggregate (row 3).  For some commodity groups, 
however, the bound value is above the average, for cereals, olive oil, sugar, poultry/eggs, and 
wine. Those commodities would have been less penalized by the bindings with respect to the 
average level of the value of their subsidies over the historical time period.   
The results also show that the calculation of the bindings based on 1986-90 averages 
resulted in bound values that are higher than what would have resulted from a 36% reduction on 
the average for the whole period, as shown by the positive values in row 7 of Table 3.  This is 
because the export subsidy expenditures from 1987 to 1989 were the highest for the entire time 
period 1972-1999 (Chart 3 below).     
The relationship between the bound mean (µ 1) and the original mean (µ 0) is nonlinear. 
Therefore, a change in bound value B does not imply a one-for one change in the expected value 
of export subsidies.  Differentiating (17) with respect to B gives:  







  The smaller the bound value B with respect to the mean value, the larger the effect of a 
reduction in the bound values on the average of export subsidy expenditures.  This is because the 
                                                                                                                                                       
so.  Therefore, 1972-99 refers to a period where a hypothetical binding could be imposed on the distribution.  
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smaller the difference B – µ 0 is, the smaller F (Z*) will be, and the change in µ 1 given a change 
in B will be closer to one. 
The results in row 8 of Table 3 show that the largest reductions in the average of 
protection given a decrease in the binding will occur for rice, beef and veal and in aggregate.  







































Volume and value bindings complement each other in decreasing the use of export subsidies.  
The relative effectiveness depends on their relative magnitudes and on the changes in excess 
supply and excess demand curves over time.  Export subsidy reductions limit the use of fixed 
domestic support prices under certain circumstances.  The bindings have a “size” effect of 
reducing value and volume of export subsidies, and a “risk” effect of creating instability in farm 
revenues, given changes in world supply and demand conditions.  However, the simple 
mechanics of volume and value restrictions is not enough to describe the issues involving trade 
liberalization and reductions in export subsidies.   
The statistical analysis of a time series on export subsidies makes it possible to quantify the 
effects of the bindings in a stochastic setting.  If one simply compares the bindings with the  
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actual levels prior to the commitments, it may appear that the level of protection is higher under 
the new rules. But this is just because countries had means to manipulate their baseline levels in 
order to start the reductions at a higher level than their average level.  The analysis shows that 
the imposition of bindings decreases the average protection applied and is trade liberalizing. 
Several outstanding issues on export subsidies include how countries circumvent 
commitments by ‘front-loading” on future allowances, “banking” on unused subsidies from 
previous periods, or via product aggregation, where export subsidies for inputs end up 
subsidizing final product beyond the limits as a way of transferring subsidies from one product 
group to another (Leetmaa and Ackerman). Those issues refer to manipulations of the baseline 
and schedule of reductions to circumvent commitments. 
It is also important to extend the analysis on what concerns Export Promotion and Food Aid 
and Export Credit Guarantees as compensation or escape route from the commitments on exports 
subsidies.  Many export subsidy commitments are also implicitly included (sometimes only 
partially) in the market access and domestic support components of the Agreement.  This 
conflation means that a decrease in tariffs or domestic support will automatically require a fall in 
export subsidies (and vice-versa). 
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 7DEOH ￿￿ &RXQWULHV ([FHHGLQJ 85$$ &RPPLWPHQWV RQ ([SRUW 6XEVLGLHV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ DQG ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿9DOXH ￿￿￿￿￿9ROXPH
&RXQWU\ &RPPRGLW\ &RPPLWPHQW 1RWLILFDWLRQ 9DOXH &RXQWU\ &RPPRGLW\ &RPPLWPHQW 1RWLILFDWLRQ 9ROXPH
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
8￿ ￿￿￿￿ 8￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ RI &RPP W W ￿ RI &RPP
&\SUXV Cheese 187.23 759.57 405.68 Cyprus Cheese 986.00 1,860.00 188.64
+XQJDU\ Corn 1,453.55 4,092.71 281.57 Norway Poultry meat 27.40 58.60 213.87
+XQJDU\ Read pepper meal 2,411.41 3,536.74 146.67 South Africa Beer 27,417.00 28,940.00 105.55
1RUZD\ Poultry meat 109.70 266.41 242.86 South Africa Other milk products 444.00 616.00 138.74
6RXWK $IULFD Cocoa and preparations 854.97 922.84 107.94 South Africa Wine products 23,598.00 24,217.00 102.62
6RXWK $IULFD Tea 126.70 141.77 111.89 Switzerland-Liecht Bétail d'élevage 13,806.00 15,312.00 110.91
￿￿￿￿￿9DOXH ￿￿￿￿￿9ROXPH
&RXQWU\ &RPPRGLW\ &RPPLWPHQW 1RWLILFDWLRQ 9DOXH &RXQWU\ &RPPRGLW\ &RPPLWPHQW 1RWLILFDWLRQ 9ROXPH
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
8￿ ￿￿￿￿ 8￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ RI &RPP W W ￿ RI &RPP
(&￿￿￿ Rice 57,805.43 81,674.21 141.29 (&￿￿￿ Beef meat 1,073,900.00 1,177,400.00 109.64
(&￿￿￿ Wine 60,972.85 67,420.81 110.58 (&￿￿￿ Olive oil 135,400.00 140,400.00 103.69
+XQJDU\ Read pepper meal 1,805.91 2,540.06 140.65 (&￿￿￿ Rice 157,100.00 226,500.00 144.18
6RXWK $IULFD Cocoa and preparations 675.13 2,177.49 322.53 (&￿￿￿ Wine 2,742,100.00 3,034,900.00 110.68
6RXWK $IULFD Vege, fruit and nut preps... 18,463.42 21,001.10 113.74 ,VUDHO Vegetables 89.30 90.00 100.78
6RXWK $IULFD Waters 756.56 1,086.77 143.65 3RODQG Sugar 122,900.00 143,000.00 116.35
6RXWK $IULFD Wine products 4,591.23 8,230.04 179.26 6RXWK $IULFD Vege, fruit and nut preps... 235,791.00 248,684.00 105.47
6RXWK $IULFD Wine products 22,742.00 140,732.00 618.82
￿￿￿￿￿9DOXH ￿￿￿￿￿9ROXPH
&RXQWU\ &RPPRGLW\ &RPPLWPHQW 1RWLILFDWLRQ 9DOXH &RXQWU\ &RPPRGLW\ &RPPLWPHQW 1RWLILFDWLRQ 9ROXPH
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
8￿ ￿￿￿￿ 8￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ RI &RPP W W ￿ RI &RPP
1RUZD\ Cheese 56,294.14 63,798.68 113.33 &\SUXV Pig meat 958.00 16,311.00 1,702.61
1RUZD\ Sheepmeat 3,022.68 3,371.76 111.55 1RUZD\ Cheese 20,270.20 20,601.21 101.63
6RXWK $IULFD Wine products 3,990.51 4,254.90 106.63 1RUZD\ Eggs and egg products 1,787.30 2,092.01 117.05
1RUZD\ Pigmeat 4,295.10 4,547.11 105.87
1RUZD\ Sheepmeat 771.10 1,096.61 142.21
￿ 1R GDWD DYDLODEOH IRU WKH ((& LQ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3RODQG Sugar 118,300.00 176,532.26 149.22
6RXWK $IULFD Beer 25,428.00 26,601.00 104.61
6RXWK $IULFD Wine products 21,866.00 49,547.00 226.59
8QLWHG 6WDWHV Skim milk powder 92,217.00 96,303.00 104.43
6RXUFH￿ $XWKRU￿V FDOFXODWLRQV IURP WKH 1RWLILFDWLRQV WR WKH :72  